

**Proposals by the Board of Directors
to be presented at the Annual General Meeting ("AGM")
of Shareholders of Husqvarna AB (publ) on Thursday, April 16, 2026**

The below proposals correspond with the numbering set forth in the agenda proposed by the Board of Directors, as set forth in the separate Notice of AGM.

Proposed distribution of earnings (Item 8b)

The Board of Directors proposes a dividend for the financial year 2025 of SEK 1.25 per share, to be paid in two installments. The Board of Directors proposes a dividend of SEK 0.50 per share with a planned record date of Monday, April 20, 2026 and a dividend of SEK 0.75 per share with a planned record date of Tuesday, October 20, 2026. If the AGM resolves in accordance with the proposal, the estimated (i) last day for trading in shares of Husqvarna AB with right to the applicable part of the dividend, (ii) applicable record date, and (iii) payment date from Euroclear Sweden AB, are as follows

	First installment (SEK 0.50 per share)	Second installment (SEK 0.75 per share)
Last day for trading in Husqvarna shares with right to dividend	Thursday, April 16, 2026	Friday, October 16, 2026
Record Day	Monday, April 20, 2026	Tuesday, October 20, 2026
Payment Date	Thursday, April 23, 2026	Friday, October 23, 2026

Resolution on guidelines for remuneration to Group Management (Item 14)

The Board of Directors proposes that the following guidelines for remuneration for the CEO and other members of Group Management be approved by the AGM 2026. These guidelines do not apply to any remuneration that is otherwise resolved on or approved directly by the AGM or any other general meeting of shareholders.

The overall group objective is to achieve market leadership where long-term profitable growth and an innovation-leading position are important aspects. The Company's business model is based on the strategy of achieving market leadership and profitable growth by providing the best solutions for forestry, park and garden care and for the construction industry, by maximizing assets and minimizing the operation's waste and carbon emissions. More information about the Company's strategy and financial targets is available on the Company's website <https://www.husqvarnagroup.com/en/financial-targets>.

Successful implementation of the Company's business strategy and safeguarding of the Company's long-term interests, including its sustainability, presupposes that the Company can recruit and retain qualified employees. This requires that the Company can offer competitive remuneration.

The guidelines set forth in this item shall apply to remuneration and other terms of employment for Group Management, as defined in the Company's annual report. The guidelines shall apply to employment agreements entered into after the AGM 2026 as well as to amendments to existing employment agreements made thereafter.

Remuneration to Group Management shall be market-based and based on the position, individual performance and the Group's performance, while the remuneration shall be competitive in the country of employment. The total remuneration to Group Management shall comprise fixed cash salary, variable cash remuneration in the form of short-term incentives based on annual performance targets, long-term incentives, pension and other benefits. In addition thereto, there are terms for notice period and severance pay.

In addition, the AGM may – irrespective of these guidelines – resolve on, inter alia, share-related or share price-related remuneration.

Husqvarna shall strive to offer a competitive total remuneration (i.e., all components of remuneration described below) with an emphasis on “pay-for-performance”.

Fixed cash salary

Fixed salary shall constitute the basis for the total remuneration and may amount to at most 70 percent of the total remuneration. The salary shall be related to the relevant market and reflect the scope of influence, contribution and skills associated with the position. The salary shall be reviewed regularly to ensure continued competitiveness and reward for performance.

Variable cash remuneration (Short-term Incentive, “STI”)

Fulfilment of criteria for awarding variable cash remuneration shall be measured over a period of one year. The variable cash remuneration may amount to at most 150 percent of the fixed salary and to at most 50 percent of the total remuneration. The Board of Directors decides whether the maximum levels shall be utilized or whether a lower level shall be used. The STI level is determined by the Board of Directors based on the size of the position, taking into account the degree of influence, contribution and skills involved in the position, but also the country of employment.

The variable cash remuneration shall be conditional upon fulfilment of established financial criteria - such as operating profit, organic growth, cash flow, return on capital employed - and may also include non-financial criteria, in order to promote the group’s business strategy, including its sustainability. The Board of Directors and the People Committee (the “Committee”) shall determine these criteria for the Company and/or for the business unit for which the member of Group Management is responsible, as well as define the minimum “Entry” level that must be exceeded for variable remuneration to be paid, and a maximum “Stretch” level relevant for the coming measurement period.

Up to a maximum of 20 percent of the total STI opportunity for the CEO and other members of Group Management may be based on financial or non-financial individual KPIs (key performance indicators). The criteria shall be designed so that they contribute to the Company’s business strategy and long-term interests, including sustainability. The extent to which the criteria for awarding variable remuneration have been fulfilled shall be evaluated/determined when the applicable one-year measurement period has ended. The Committee is responsible for the evaluation, which shall be based on the most recent financial information published by the Company. Any individual KPIs for the CEO shall be determined and evaluated by the Board of Directors and the Committee, while the CEO shall be responsible for determining and evaluating individual KPIs for the other members of Group Management.

Long-term incentive programs

The Board of Directors shall annually evaluate whether a long-term incentive program shall be offered and proposed to the AGM. The award level of such a long-term incentive program may amount to at most 120 percent of the fixed salary at the time when the program is launched.

Pension and other benefits

Pension and disability benefits shall be designed so as to reflect rules and practice in the country of employment. The pension plans shall be defined contribution and the employer’s contributions, including contributions for disability pension/insurance, may amount to at most 40 percent of the fixed cash salary and to at most 30 percent of the total remuneration.

Other benefits may include, for example, life and health insurance, housing allowance and company car. Costs for such benefits may amount to at most 20 percent of the fixed cash salary and to at most 15 percent of the total remuneration. For employments governed by mandatory rules, pension and other benefits may be adjusted to comply with mandatory rules or established local practice, taking into account, to the extent possible, the overall purpose of these guidelines.

Members of Group Management living abroad may receive additional remuneration and benefits to the extent reasonable in view of the special circumstances related to the foreign assignment, taking into account, to the extent possible, the overall purpose of these guidelines. Such remuneration and benefits may not exceed 80 percent of the fixed cash salary.

Termination of employment

The notice period may not exceed twelve months if notice of termination is given by the Company. Fixed cash salary during the notice period and severance pay may together not exceed an amount corresponding to fixed salary for two years. The notice period may not exceed six months without entitlement to severance pay if notice of termination is given by the executive, unless severance pay is payable to compensate for a longer notice period. The member of Group Management shall be subject to a non-compete obligation during the notice period. Based on the circumstances of the individual case, a non-compete obligation, against payment of severance pay, may also apply after the expiry of the notice period. Such non-compete obligation may apply for a maximum of 24 months after the expiry of the notice period and the severance pay paid during the period may not exceed an amount corresponding to the fixed salary.

In addition, extra remuneration may be paid for non-competing assignments as compensation for loss of income and shall only be paid to the extent that the former member of Group Management is not entitled to severance pay. The remuneration shall amount to at most 60 percent of the fixed salary at the time when the employment ended, unless otherwise provided by mandatory collective bargaining provisions, and shall be paid during the period the non-compete obligation applies, but for a maximum of 24 months after termination of employment.

Salary and employment conditions for employees

In preparing the Board of Directors' proposal for these remuneration guidelines, salary and employment conditions for employees have been considered by including information on the employees' total income, the components of remuneration and the increase and decrease over time, in the Committee's and the Board's decision basis when evaluating whether the guidelines and their limitations are reasonable. Information will be provided in the remuneration report on the development of the gap between remuneration to senior executives and other employees, which is to be published in accordance with the EU Shareholder Rights Directive.

Decision-making process to determine, review and implement the guidelines

The Board of Directors has established a committee that functions as the "remuneration committee" within the meaning of the Swedish Corporate Governance Code. Among the Committee's tasks is to prepare the Board of Directors' decision to propose guidelines for remuneration to Group Management. The Board of Directors shall prepare a proposal for new guidelines at least every four years and submit the proposal to the AGM.

The guidelines shall apply until new guidelines have been adopted by the AGM. The Committee shall also monitor and evaluate programs for variable remuneration to Group Management, the application of the guidelines for remuneration to Group Management as well as the current remuneration structures and remuneration levels in the Company.

The members of the Committee are independent in relation to Husqvarna and Group Management. The CEO and other members of Group Management do not participate in the Board of Directors' handling of and decisions on remuneration matters where they themselves are concerned.

Deviation from the guidelines

The Board of Directors may temporarily resolve to deviate from the guidelines, in whole or in part, if, in a particular case, there is a special reason for the deviation and a deviation is necessary to serve the Company's long-term interests, including its sustainability, or to ensure the Company's financial viability. As stated above, the Committee's tasks include preparing the Board of Directors' decisions on remuneration matters. This also includes any deviations from the guidelines. A deviation from the guidelines may not result in any remuneration element exceeding the double maximum level specified in these guidelines.

Resolution regarding adoption of a long-term incentive program (LTI 2026) (Item 15)

Summary of the program

The Board of Directors proposes that the AGM 2026 resolves to adopt a performance-based long-term incentive program ("LTI 2026") in line with the description below. The program is based on the same principles as the incentive program granted in 2025 (LTI 2025).

LTI 2026 is proposed to include a maximum of 80 employees in the Husqvarna Group and offers participants the opportunity to receive performance share awards. Provided that certain performance targets and conditions are met during a three-year vesting period, performance share awards granted in 2026 will entitle the participant to B-shares in Husqvarna as set forth below.

Participants in LTI 2026 will be granted a number of performance share awards based on the participant's annual target salary (fixed salary plus variable salary at target level) for 2026.

The number of performance share awards that vest and entitle the participant to B-shares further depends on the fulfilment of certain levels determined by the Board regarding earnings per share, weight 90 percent, and levels determined regarding reduction of the Company's carbon emissions, weight 10 percent, during the calendar years 2026-2028. The levels determined are "Entry", "Target" and "Stretch". Entry constitutes the minimum level that must be exceeded for the performance share awards to entitle to allocation of B-shares.

The levels correspond to the following number of B-shares, with a linear increase between each level:

- Entry: 10 percent of annual target salary / the share price SEK 45.1¹
- Target: 33 percent of annual target salary / the share price SEK 45.1¹
- Stretch: 66 percent of annual target salary / the share price SEK 45.1¹

If the price of the Company's B-share were to increase by more than 200 percent during the three-year vesting period, the number of B-shares to which the performance share awards entitle will be limited to the value corresponding to the maximum allocation of B-shares at the Stretch performance level at a share price increase of 200 percent from grant of share awards to transfer of shares (vesting period). This limitation enables control and creates predictability over the program's maximum scope and cost.

¹ Corresponding to the average closing price of Husqvarna's B share on Nasdaq Stockholm during December 2025, January 2026 and February 2026.

Additional terms

The following terms shall apply to the performance share awards:

- The shares are allocated free of charge;
- Vest three years after grant (vesting period);
- Vesting of performance share awards and entitlement to allocation of B-shares in Husqvarna is conditional upon the participant, with certain exceptions, remaining employed within the Husqvarna Group;
- Do not entitle to compensation for dividends on the underlying shares; and
- May not be transferred.

Design and administration

The Board of Directors, or a committee appointed by the Board, shall be responsible for the detailed design and administration of LTI 2026, within the framework of the presented terms and guidelines. In this context, the Board of Directors shall be entitled to make adjustments to comply with specific Swedish or foreign regulations or market conditions. The Board of Directors shall also be entitled to make other adjustments if significant changes occur in the Husqvarna Group or its environment, which would result in the resolved terms and conditions for LTI 2026 no longer being appropriate.

Allocation

In accordance with the above principles and assumptions, LTI 2026 will encompass the following number of B-shares for the different categories of employees:

- the CEO approximately 230,400 B-shares,
- other members of Group Management, each on average approximately 74,800 B-shares, corresponding to a total of approximately 524,000 B-shares, and
- other participants, each on average approximately 37,400 B-shares, corresponding to a total of approximately 2,695,000 B-shares.

The above estimated scope of the program is based on achievement of the Stretch performance level, as described above.

Scope and costs of the program

LTI 2026 is estimated to comprise a maximum of 3.45 million B-shares, corresponding to approx. 0.6 percent of the total number of outstanding shares. The Company has approximately 576 million outstanding shares. Outstanding rights to shares under previously adopted long-term incentive programs (LTI 2023, LTI 2024 and LTI 2025) amount to approximately 1.3 percent of the total number of outstanding shares. The impact of the Company's incentive programs on significant key performance indicators is only marginal. Information about LTI 2023, LTI 2024 and LTI 2025 is available in the Company's annual report for 2025, note 4, as well as on the Company's website, www.husqvarnagroup.com.

LTI 2026 will be accounted for in accordance with IFRS 2 - Share-based Payment. IFRS 2 requires that performance share awards be expensed as personnel costs over the vesting period and recognized directly against equity. The estimated costs for social security charges will be expensed as personnel costs in the income statement through ongoing provisions. The cost of the program before tax at achievement of the Target performance level is estimated at SEK 93 million allocated over the vesting period 2026-2028. At the Stretch performance level, the corresponding cost is estimated at SEK 186 million. The amounts include estimated costs for financing and social security charges. The cost calculations have been based on assumptions of a share price of SEK 45.1 at grant of performance share awards, that the annual share price of the Company's B-share is unchanged, that social security charges amount to 19 percent and an annual employee turnover of 0 percent among participants in LTI 2026.

To secure delivery of Husqvarna B-shares under LTI 2026 and limit the costs of LTI 2026, including social security charges, the Board of Directors intends to take hedging measures in the form of equity swap agreements with a third party who would then purchase Husqvarna B-shares in its own name to thereafter transfer them to the participants in accordance with LTI 2026, provided that the AGM resolves in accordance with the proposal under item 16 on the agenda. The hedging measures are described below under item 16 on the agenda. The intention is not to issue new shares as a result of LTI 2026.

Reasons for the proposal

The purpose of LTI 2026 is to influence and reward long-term performance, align the interests of shareholders and company management, attract and retain key employees and provide variable remuneration instead of fixed salary. In light of the above, the Board of Directors considers that the introduction of LTI 2026 has a positive effect on the continued development of the Husqvarna Group and that it is therefore beneficial for both the shareholders and the Company.

Preparation of the matter

LTI 2026 is based on the same principles as LTI 2025 and has, in accordance with guidelines from the Committee, been prepared by Group Management, in consultation with external advisers, taking into account evaluations of previous incentive programs. LTI 2026 has been discussed at Board meetings during 2025 and 2026.

Resolution on authorization to enter into equity swap arrangements to cover obligations under LTI 2026 and other previously adopted LTI programs (Item 16)

The Board of Directors proposes that the AGM 2026 resolves to authorize the Board of Directors, during the period up to the next AGM, on one or more occasions, to resolve that the Company enters into one or more equity swap agreements with a third party (e.g., a bank) on terms that correspond to market practice, with the aim of securing the Company's obligations in accordance with LTI 2026 and previously adopted incentive programs. An equity swap arrangement means that the third party, against consideration paid by the Company, acquires (in its own name) such number of Husqvarna B-shares as are necessary to cover the Company's obligations under adopted incentive programs and thereafter transfers (in its own name) such shares to the participants in accordance with the terms of the adopted incentive programs.

Resolution on authorization regarding new issue (Item 17)

The Board of Directors proposes that the AGM 2026 resolves to authorize the Board of Directors, on one or more occasions up to the time of the next AGM, to resolve on a new issue of not more than 57,634,377 B-shares, corresponding to ten percent of the total number of shares in the Company, with payment in kind.

The subscription price for the new shares shall be based on the market price of the Company's B-shares. The purpose of the authorization is to facilitate acquisitions where payment is made with own shares.

Majority Requirements

For a valid resolution under all the agenda items above, a shareholder majority of half of the votes cast at the AGM is required.

The Board of Directors' Statement pursuant to Chapter 18, Section 4 of the Swedish Companies Act (2005:551)

Background

The Board of Directors hereby submits the following statement pursuant to Chapter 18, Section 4 of the Swedish Companies Act.

The Board's reasons as to why the proposed dividend is compatible with the provisions set out in Chapter 17, Section 3, second and third paragraphs of the Swedish Companies Act are described in this Appendix A.

Assets and liabilities have been measured at fair value in accordance with Chapter 4, Section 14a of the Swedish Annual Accounts Act (1995:1554). Had the measurement not been made at fair value, shareholders' equity would have been SEK 48 million lower.

The nature, scope and risks of the business

The nature and scope of the Company's operations are set out in the Articles of Association and in the published annual reports. The operations conducted by the Company and the Group do not entail risks beyond those that occur or can be assumed to occur in the industry or such risks as are generally associated with the conduct of business operations. For material events, reference is made to the Report of the Directors in the annual report for the financial year 2025. The Company's and the Group's exposure to economic cycles does not differ from what is generally applicable within the industry.

The financial position of the Company and the Group

The financial position of the Company and the Group as of 31 December 2025 is presented in the most recently adopted annual report. The annual report also describes the accounting principles applied in the valuation of assets, provisions and liabilities.

As set out in the proposed appropriation of profits, the Board proposes that a dividend of SEK 1.25 per share be distributed, divided into two payment instalments: SEK 0.50 per share with Monday, 20 April 2026, as the first planned record date, and SEK 0.75 per share with Tuesday, 20 October 2026, as the second planned record date. The proposed dividend corresponds to 2.4 percent of the Company's shareholders' equity and 3.0 percent of the Group's shareholders' equity.

The annual report shows, inter alia, that the Company's equity/assets ratio amounts to 49 percent and the Group's equity/assets ratio to 45 percent. The Company's and the Group's equity/assets ratios do not deviate from what is customary in the industry. The proposed dividend does not jeopardize the investments deemed necessary for the business.

The proposed dividend does not affect the ability of the Company or the Group to meet present or anticipated payment obligations in due time. The liquidity forecasts of the Company and the Group include preparedness to manage fluctuations in ongoing payment obligations.

The financial position of the Company and the Group gives no cause for any assessment other than that the Company will be able to continue its operations and that the Company and the Group are expected to fulfil their obligations in the short and long term.

The Board considers that the level of shareholders' equity in the Company and the Group is appropriate in relation to the scope of the operations and the risks associated with the conduct of the business, taking into account the proposed dividend.

Conclusion

With reference to the above and to what has otherwise come to the attention of the Board, it is the Board's assessment that the proposed dividend is justifiable in view of the provisions set out in Chapter 17, Section 3, second and third paragraphs of the Swedish Companies Act.

Stockholm in March 2026
Husqvarna AB (publ)
The Board of Directors